寡头制造厂商的产品延伸服务定价  

Pricing of product-supplementary services under duopoly manufacturers

作　　者：沈铁松[1,2] 熊中楷[1] 吴丙山[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆工商职业学院财经系,重庆400052

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2009年第5期37-43,共7页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70571088)

摘　　要：将产品延伸服务作为制造企业产品售后的延伸,首次把产品延伸服务作为企业利润的增长极进行微观定量研究.对存在产品销售及产品延伸服务的二阶段寡头竞争市场进行了博弈分析,证明了转换费用存在双重性时产品销售与产品延伸服务两阶段Bertrand-Nash博弈的子博弈精炼Nash均衡的存在性与唯一性,并与Bertrand-Stackelberg博弈进行比较分析.研究表明:厂商产品定价随其转换费用的增加而降低;转换费用影响产品延伸服务市场份额的再分配,降低了消费者的效用水平;若转换费用具有双重性,厂商则必须依据自身条件设定转换费用.After sale of product, Manufacturer provides product-supplementary services as follows. This paper analyzes the duopoly pricing strategy choice of manufacturer under considering two periods of sale of the product and Product-supplementary services. It is proofed that there exists only one Subgame Perfect Nash-equilibrium in the two periods Bertrand-Nash game as the duality of switch cost, and then comparative static analysis of the result with the Bertrand-Stackelberg game of product- supplementary services. It shows any increasing of switch cost will reallocate the share of service market and result in the decreasing of consumers＇utility. The dualistic switch cost must be set up according to the precondition himself. It is the first quantity research about product- supplementary services as a direction of enhancing-profit.

关 键 词：产品延伸服务 定价 BERTRAND博弈 转换费用 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]