消极与积极:宏观调控中的地方政府行为困境——基于制度分析的框架  

Negative and Positive:a Dilemma of Local Government's Behaviors in Macro-control

作　　者：张勇[1] 张宁[2] 刘瑞[3] 

机构地区：[1]财政部财政科学研究所,北京100142 [2]水利部漳卫南局信息中心,山东德州253009 [3]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872

出　　处：《北京行政学院学报》2009年第3期67-71,共5页Journal of Beijing administration institute

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(07&ZD005-KTJB01)

摘　　要：随着中国经济的转型,地方政府逐渐与中央政府成为利益相对独立的主体,一些具体的制度安排———诸如政绩考核体制和财政分权体制等,给了地方政府在紧缩性的宏观调控过程中与中央政策博弈的动机;而中央政府对于地方政府的博弈行为惩戒力度明显不足,进一步强化了地方的博弈动机。本文认为,正是制度供给的不足导致了地方消极对待中央紧缩性的宏观调控政策;在赶超战略的历史任务尚未结束的背景下,地方政府在宏观调控中的行为进入了制度供给的困境。With China＇s economic transformation, local governments in China have gradually become relatively independent of the central government. Some specifically institutional arrangements, such as the system of evaluating cadre＇s performance and the financial decentralization system, brought about a policy games between the central government and local governments in the process of tighten macro-economic control. The insufficiency of punishing efforts to the game action of local governments further strengthened the motives of local governments. This paper holds that, it is the insufficient supply of system that leads to local governments＂ negative treating the macro-economic control of the central government, given that the Forging Ahead Strategy is ＂t finished up to now yet, local government＇s behaviors in the process of macro-economic control brought about a dilemma of supply of system.

关 键 词：宏观调控 地方政府 制度供给 困境 

分 类 号：F120.3[经济管理—世界经济]