建设工程评标委托代理关系的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Principal-Agent Relation in Evaluating Bids of Construction Project

作　　者：舒美英[1] 蔡建国[1] 范义荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江林学院园林学院,浙江临安311300

出　　处：《河南大学学报（自然科学版）》2009年第3期323-326,共4页Journal of Henan University:Natural Science

基　　金：国家科技部星火计划(2007EA00003);浙江省科技厅重大项目(2003C12014);浙江省教育厅资助项目(20060659)

摘　　要：运用博弈论中的委托代理理论对建设工程评标专家的激励约束IC与参与约束IR进行了研究.从信息对称和信息不对称两个角度分析了评标专家的努力水平、实际收入和业主的期望收入;从IC和IR均成立、IR不成立I、C不成立I、C和IR均不成立四方面分析了评标专家的努力工作水平、努力工作成本系数、风险规避度、产出方差和业主收益.分析表明,委托代理关系中的IC和IR相比,IC更为重要,业主要想提高评标效果,就必须采取相应的措施,激励评标专家努力工作,抑制道德风险的发生.According to the game theory, the incentive compatibility constraint （IC） and the participation constraint （IR） in principal-agent relationship between the bid inviting party and bid evaluation committee were analyzed. The bid evaluation committee＇s hard work and real income, the bid inviting party anticipant income were analyzed under symmetric and asymmetric information. Being absent of IC and IR conditional expression, the bid evaluation committee＇s work hard, work cost, measure of risk aversion, output variance and the bid inviting party income were discussed under IC and IR existence, IR inexistence, IC inexistence, IC and IR inexistence. IC was more important than IR. If the bid inviting party wants to improve the bid evaluation efficience, it must adopt incentive mechanisms which can make the bid evaluation committee work hard, in the mean time thd incentive mechanisms play efficient roles in solving the moral hazard.

关 键 词：评标 委托代理 博弈 道德风险 

分 类 号：TU723.2[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]