环境治理博弈复杂性与演化均衡稳定性分析  

Complexity and Evolutionary Stability Analysis in Environmental Pollution Treatment Games

作　　者：陶建格[1] 薛惠锋[1] 韩建新[1] 张朝阳[1] 刘春江[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学自动化学院,陕西西安710072

出　　处：《环境科学与技术》2009年第7期89-93,共5页Environmental Science & Technology

基　　金：河南省软科学计划研究项目(072400421400;072400421090)

摘　　要：根据系统工程和环境经济学相关理论,环境治理博弈具有限理性、自主性、动态性、经济性等特点,针对当前环境治理博弈研究中完全信息、静态决策和理性决策等的局限性,文章运用演化博弈理论方法,建立了一个环境治理博弈的演化博弈均衡模型,分析了参与博弈主体的动态演变过程。研究结果表明,环境治理状况的演化方向与双方博弈的支付矩阵相关,同时与系统初始状态相关。并得出监管成本、处罚力度,以及企业的社会责任是影响环境治理状况演变的关键因素。Based on theory of system engineering and environmental economics, environmental pollution treatment games is characterized with bounded rational, self-determination, dynamic and economic system. In view of the limitations in studying environmental pollution treatment by complete information, static decision-making and rational decision-making methods, an evolutionary game model of environmental pollution treatment based on evolutionary game theory was established to analyze its dynamic evolutionary procedure. Results showed that the system evolutionary direction is closely related to player＇s payoff, and affected by initial status of the system. Key factors that affected the system evolution including cost of controller, intensity of punishment and enterprise environmental responsibility were also studied.

关 键 词：环境治理 有限理性 演化博弈 

分 类 号：X830.2[环境科学与工程—环境工程] TP393.02[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]