非对称条件下双边市场的定价模式  

Pricing models in two-sided markets with asymmetric conditions

作　　者：刘启[1] 李明志[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院经济系,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2009年第6期917-919,924,共4页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672007;70621061);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(06JJD630014)

摘　　要：双边市场(也称为双边平台)有两种类型的参与者,如媒体中的广告商和观众,两者通过平台相互影响。该文研究了参与者处于不对等地位时双边市场的定价和竞争问题。在Hotelling框架下给出了平台的定价公式。当市场结构发生变化、竞争强度加强时,平台的定价模式会发生变化。这解释了双边市场中有关价格结构的基本问题。结果表明:垄断情况下,平台的定价向某一方参与者倾斜;当市场结构由垄断变为寡头垄断时,会迫使平台的定价向另一方参与者倾斜。该结果有利于企业定价和政府制定政策。Two-sided markets, also called two-sided platforms, have two types of participants which interact through a platform, such as advertisers in a media and audiences. This paper describes pricing and competition problems in two-sided markets where the two types of participants are asymmetrical. The pricing equations are derived in Hotelling framework. When the market structure changes and the competition intensifies~ the platform price structure will charge accordingly. The basic problems about the price structure in two-sided markets are explained in the framework. The results show that when the market structure is a monopoly, the monopoly platform will charge less to one side, while when the market structure becomes an oligopoly, the two platforms will charge less to the other side. These results will benefit firms and governments when determining prices and policies.

关 键 词：双边市场 软件平台 价格结构 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]