煤矿安全规制的委托—代理模型分析  

Analysis on Principal-Agent Relationship in China's Coal Mine Safety Regulation

作　　者：肖兴志[1] 赵杨[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《财贸研究》2009年第3期80-87,共8页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"中国煤矿安全规制研究"(批准号:06JJD630002);辽宁省科技厅软科学项目"和谐辽宁背景下的煤矿安全监管机制创新研究"(批准号:2008401035)

摘　　要：中国煤矿安全生产形势不容乐观。究其原因,在很大程度上与政府煤矿安全规制的不当密切相关,从理论层面分析,可以归结为没有正确认识和处理好煤矿安全规制中的委托—代理关系。在中国煤矿安全规制中,不仅存在着中央政府与煤矿企业关于安全生产的委托—代理关系,同时还存在着中央政府与地方政府关于安全监管的委托—代理关系。在这样一种特殊的委托—代理关系下,地方政府就可能与煤矿企业合谋,从而可能对安全规制政策的制定及规制的效果产生很大的影响。The security situation in China＇s coal mine production is not that optimistic. To a great extent, the causes are relevant to the improper government safety regulation, including inappropriate policies and loose implementation. However, from the theoretical perspective, they are attributed to govenment＇s inaccurate understanding and improper handling the principal-agent relationship in coal mine security regulation. The principal-agent relationships of China＇s mine safety regulation include not only relationship between central government and coal mine enterprises on safety production, but also relationship between central government and local government on safety supervision. Therefore, local governments may conspire with coal mining enterprises, which will impact significantly on security regulation policies and regulatory effect.

关 键 词：煤矿企业 安全规制 委托-代理 合谋行为 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]