国家审计结果公告制度的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of China National Audit Reporting System

作　　者：陈尘肇[1,2] 孟卫东[1] 朱如意[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 [2]审计署驻广州特派员办事处

出　　处：《审计研究》2009年第3期9-13,共5页Auditing Research

摘　　要：实行审计结果公告制度是民主政治发展的必然要求,然而我国国家审计结果公告制度的现状是公告很少。本文利用完全信息动态博弈和不完全信息动态博弈理论,以政府和民众作为博弈参与者分析了目前审计结果公告方面存在的问题,发现在大部分均衡状态下,不公告是政府的最优选择。依据调查问卷的统计结果,我们得出,我国当前的审计结果公告制度中政府和民众之间的博弈是不完全对称信息动态博弈。通过对比之前的研究结论,我们发现如果政府长期不公告的话,随着民众对政府作为与否的概率判断恶化,最终必然引发政府不公告、民众不支持的次优均衡,社会效率终将受到更大的损失。With the development of democratic politic, the practice of national audit reporting system will be inevitable.But now the public report of our country is few.This paper analyzes the problem based on completely symmetric information and non completely symmetric information dynamic game theory.We find that the better choice of government is not reported under most equilibrium.Based on the statistic of investigation, we find our game between government and demos is not completely symmetric information dynamic game.Compared with the conclusion above,we find that if the government do not report in a long term,the sub-excellent equilibrium that the government do not report the audit result and the demos do not support the govemment will take place and the social efficiency will suffer the larger losses.

关 键 词：审计结果公告制度 国家审计 审计公告 博弈 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]