审计师轮换规制效果的比较研究  

Comparative Study on the Impact of Auditor Rotation Regulation

作　　者：龚启辉[1] 王善平[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学会计学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2009年第3期81-90,共10页Auditing Research

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-06-0703);国家自然基金项目(70372040)的资助

摘　　要：本文以2001至2007年间获得标准无保留审计意见的A股上市公司为样本,使用经过调整后的截面Jones模型估计出的公司操纵应计利润的绝对值作为审计质量的衡量指标,考察执行CPA轮换和事务所轮换对审计质量的影响及其差异。研究发现,CPA轮换由于规制缺乏惩戒性措施而整体上难以提高审计质量,但有促于抑制公司正向盈余管理;事务所轮换则为公司在不同年度之间进行盈余波动操纵提供了新空间,即轮换前采取保守会计政策低报收益,轮换后采取激进会计政策高报收益;CPA轮换与事务所轮换对审计质量的影响存在差异。This paper, using the data of those listed firms that received clean audit opinions from 2001 to 2007 in the Chinese securities market, and measuring audit quality by the discretionary accruals calculated by the Cross-sectional Jones Model, investigates the relationship between rotation of signing auditors or firm mandatory rotation and audit quality. We find that, the rotation of CPAs is difficult to increase audit quality due to lack of afflictive measures, but which has led to better inhibition of positive earning management; Firm rotation supplies new space for clients＇ earning manipulation amongst different years, or to say, clients may underperformance before rotation by conservative accounting policy and over performance after rotation by radical accounting policy; there are some differences on the impact of audit quality between CPAs rotation and firm rotation.

关 键 词：轮换规制 审计师轮换 事务所轮换 审计质量 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F224[经济管理—国民经济]