制度租金理论初探  

Researches On System-rent

作　　者：尹玉梅[1] 张换兆[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北大学经济学院,河北保定071002

出　　处：《河北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2009年第3期60-63,共4页Journal of Hebei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目;编号:05AJL003

摘　　要：任何制度的安排首先以制度博弈主体的利益出发,通过不断的博弈行为导致不断的制度变迁以满足各主体的利益最大化要求。这就使得在制度变迁的博弈过程中很可能存在制度空间,使得主体获得额外的非生产性利益。制度因素是租金与寻租行为产生的更深层次因素,信息的不确定性和对风险的偏好也会影响寻租行为,其短期福利与长期福利无关。Every system arrangement begins from the interest of system game agent, through continuous game behaviors leading to continuous system changes to maximize the interest of every agent. System space may exist in the process of system change game making the agent earn additional nonproductive interests. System is one of profound factors of rent and rentseeking behavior, uncertainty of information and risk preference will also influence rentseeking behaviors, whose shortterm welfare and longterm welfare is unrelated.

关 键 词：制度租金 风险偏好 社会福利 

分 类 号：I206[文学—中国文学]