基于双边拍卖模型的易变质品供应链协作研究  

Study on the Supply Chain Coordination of Perishable Items Based on Double Auction

作　　者：张钦红[1] 骆建文[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2009年第3期33-37,44,共6页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572101)

摘　　要：以交易信用为协调激励机制,分析了完全信息及双边不完全信息时,持续变质的易变质品供应链的协调问题。在交易信用激励机制下,供应商通过允许下游企业延迟支付货款而激励其提高采购批量,进而实现供应链的协调。在信息对称时,通过分析双方的个人理性约束而给出交易信用长度的取值范围;当双方对彼此的资金成本存在双边信息不完全时,通过构建双边拍卖模型给出各方的最优报价策略以及均衡的交易信用长度。最后的算例验证了文章的结论。Supply chain coordination of perishable products of random lifetime under symmetric and bilateral asymmetric information is studied. The coordination mechanism used in this paper is trade credit with which the vendor can entice the buyer to enlarge his order size and thus achieve supply chain coordination. When the information is symmetric, the range of the trade credit＇s length is derived by analyzing individual constraint of the buyer and the vendor. While when the information about the firms＇ capital costs is bilateral asymmetric, double auction model is used to get the firms＇ optimal strategies and the realized length of the trade credit. Finally, extensive numerical study is proposed to demonstrate the conclusions.

关 键 词：供应链协调 易变质品 交易信用 双边拍卖 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]