寻租与贫困：基于异质性假设的生产、保护与分利模型  

Rent-seeking and Poverty:Production,Protection and Predation Model with An Assumption on Heterogeneity

作　　者：程杰[1] 武拉平[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,100094

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2009年第1期75-100,共26页Nankai Economic Studies

摘　　要：在内部和外部约束的异质性假设条件下,本文对生产、保护和分利模型进行了扩展,解释了贫困村非生产性的寻租行为对资源配置决策和经济收益的影响,并利用中国行政村的数据进行了实证检验。研究得出:内部约束条件的异质性直接影响资源在生产、保护和分利活动之间的配置,"有分利倾向"的贫困村越多,分利技术越高,资源在非生产性活动中的配置也就越多。外部约束条件的异质性间接地影响贫困村的经济收益,在政府及制度环境更倾向于激励非生产性活动的情况下,尽管通过转移支付对贫困村收入水平产生了正面效应,但这种效应由于寻租行为的负面冲击而被大幅削弱。经济发展能力或产出水平越低,资源投向保护行为的比例越高,对应于更多的非生产性寻租活动;更高的资源保护水平将进一步限制贫困村的经济发展,在外部约束条件更倾向于非生产性激励时,寻租与贫困的动态关系导致了低水平均衡的"贫困陷阱"。With an assumption on heterogeneity of both internal and external constraints, this paper develops a production,protection and predation model to explain how non-productive rent-seeking behaviors in poverty village effect resources allocation and its economic revenue ,and then makes empirical test using by data on administrative villages in China. The results indicate that heterogeneity of internal constraints directly effects resources allocation between production, protection and predation ,which more poverty villages with tendency-- predated and higher predating technology cause more resources to be allocated non-productive activities. Heterogeneity of external constrains indirectly effects economic revenue of poverty villages. On conditions that governmental and institutional environments tend to encourage non-productive activities,transfer payments show a positive effect on income,however,the effect will be reduced largely by rent-seeking. Lower capacity of economy or output will cause more resources be allocated to protective behaviors, correspondingly more rent-seeking activities. Higher level of protection will further restrict economic development of poverty villages, and dynamic relation between rent-seeking and poverty will result a low-level equilibrium ＂Poverty Trap＂.

关 键 词：寻租 贫困 生产 保护 分利 异质性 

分 类 号：F124[经济管理—世界经济] F224