信息安全设备合作的进化博弈分析  

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperation among Security Equipments

作　　者：夏子超[1] 银鹰[1] 陈晓桦[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学信息安全工程学院上海市信息安全综合管理技术研究重点实验室,上海200240

出　　处：《信息安全与通信保密》2009年第6期67-68,71,共3页Information Security and Communications Privacy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(编号:60605019)

摘　　要：基于实践过程中非理性博弈行为和信息不对称的存在,论文提出了一个基于进化博弈论的信息安全设备合作工作的模型,以防护系统安全的设备作为博弈方,对安全设备工作中的合作关系的发展变化做了分析。分析结果体现了安全设备在合作工作过程的策略变化和最终趋向的稳定状态,帮助使用者深入了解设备工作的状况。同时,讨论延伸到了网络安全设备的联动工作的策略管理,这一方向的进一步研究将对提高信息安全管理的效率有极大的启示。In view of the existence of irrationality game behavior and information asymmetry, a model of cooperation among information security equipments is proposed in this paper, which is based on evolutionary game theory. The paper analyzes the development of cooperation among information security equipments by means of replicator dynamics theory in evolutionary game theory. Final analysis results are aim for reflecting strategy changes and the finally-inclined stable status of these security equipments in the cooperation process. Meanwhile, they lead further research on the cooperation strategy of network security devices and these would play an important role in improving the efficiency of information security management.

关 键 词：进化博弈 复制动态 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]