超速驾驶行为的进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Overspeed Behavior

作　　者：余孝军[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经学院数学与统计学院,贵州贵阳550004 [2]贵州省经济系统仿真重点实验室,贵州贵阳550004

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2009年第11期14-18,共5页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：贵州省教育厅自然科学基金(黔教科2006325)

摘　　要：针对交通管理中经常要面对的超速驾驶行为,建立了驾驶员群体之间以及驾驶员群体与交管部门之间的博弈模型及其复制动态方程,并对动态方程做了分析与讨论,得出了博弈模型中各博弈方的进化稳定策略,提出了一些控制和减少超速行为的合理建议.Overspeed behavior is frequently observed in traffic. This paper presents a game model among drivers and a game between driver and traffic management department. The duplicative dynamic equations of these games are formulated and solved for stable solutions. Various evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed and some of them are suggested to reduce overspeed behavior.

关 键 词：超速 进化博弈 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] U471.1[理学—数学]