从塔尔斯基式符合论到不可定义论——戴维森真理论的心路历程  

From A Tarski-style Correspondence Theory to A Theory of Undefinability——Davidson's Mind Course of Theory of Truth

作　　者：梁义民[1] 

机构地区：[1]湛江师范学院法政学院,广东湛江524048

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2009年第6期33-39,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划学科共建项目"批判性思维与非形式逻辑"(06GC-03);湛江师范学院博士专项研究项目"戴维森意义理论研究"(ZW0703)

摘　　要：戴维森的真理论经历了一个从"塔尔斯基式符合论"最终到"不可定义论"的心路历程。早期他反对传统的事实符合论,赞同塔尔斯基的满足符合论,后来转向一种融贯式符合论;受罗蒂的批评,戴维森呈现出一种"客观性实用论"的真理观;最后戴维森以对霍维奇的冗余论的批判为例,认为任何人都没有也不可能提出一个一般性的真之定义,主张"真之不可定义"的思想。通过这一历程,戴维森表明了真之概念的有用性、客观性、实践性和基始性特点,从而为其真之语义论立场提供了有力的理论论证。Davidson＇s Truth of Theory has come through a mind course that is form a Tarski-style correspondence theory to a theory of undefinability finally. Early he opposed traditional theory of correspondence to facts and agreed with Tarski＇s satisfaction correspondence theory, subsequently turned to his coherence-style correspondence theory; criticized by Richard Rorty, Davidson took on a truth view of ＂objective pragmatism＂; lastly taking his criticizing Horwich＇s redundancy theory for example, Davidson deemed that no one put forward a general definition for truth, nor can he do it, held the thought that ＂truth is undefinable＂. During this course, Davidson has indicated the concept of truth has characteristics of usefulness, objectivity, practicality and fundamentality, by which giving a convincingly theoretical argumentation for his standpoint of truth semantics.

关 键 词：真理论 真之概念 融贯式符合论 客观性实用论 不可定义论 

分 类 号：B081[哲学宗教—哲学理论]