基于Stackelberg微分博弈的销售电价规制模型及其分析  

Regulation Model of Electricity Price and Its Analysis Based on Stackelberg Differential Game

作　　者：杨先菊[1] 龚秀松[1] 赖明勇[1] 杨洪明[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079 [2]长沙理工大学电气与信息工程学院,湖南长沙410076

出　　处：《系统工程》2009年第5期77-81,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70601003)

摘　　要：随着电力市场的建立,销售电价的市场化改革成必然趋势,本文借鉴Stackelberg微分博弈方法,并基于政府规制的思想,建立政府与电网企业间两阶段微分博弈模型,运用逆向归纳法与Hamilton-Jacobi-Bell-man方法求解,得出政府和电网企业的最优策略;模型的数值仿真表明:随着电力行业市场化改革的推进,销售电价、电网企业的供电量与政府的转移支付量均收敛于某特定值。With the establishment of the electricity market, the market-oriented reform of electricity price becomes an inevitable trend. In view of Stackelberg differential game and based on the idea of Government regulation, a two-stage game model between Government and Power Enterprise was established in this paper. By using backwards induction and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman approach, the optimal strategies of government and the power grid enterprises are obtained. The numerical simulation of the model shows：with the development of market-oriented reform,electricity price,the power supply of Power Enterprise and the transfer payments of the government are convergent in a certain value.

关 键 词：Stackelberg微分博弈 政府规制 销售电价 Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman 数值仿真 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] TM71[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]