经营者信誉资本与会计契约履行的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Manager's Reputation Capital and Performance of Accounting Contracts

作　　者：童杰成[1] 刘建秋[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学商学院,湖南湘潭411201 [2]湖南商学院会计学院,湖南长沙410205

出　　处：《西南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第3期41-44,共4页Journal of Southwest Agricultural University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：湖南省社科基金资助课题"不完全契约视角的会计信誉生成与演化研究"(08YBB200);项目负责人:刘建秋

摘　　要：会计契约的缔约主体包括企业经营者和具有其它信息需求的利益相关者,由于契约的不完全性及双方不可避免的利益冲突,企业经营者和利益相关者之间就会计契约的履行进行着博弈。经营者信誉资本的存在给经营者带来了可置信的惩罚空间,因而使得会计契约能够有效地履行。The contractors of an accounting contract include enterprise managers and other stakeholders. As a result of incomplete contracts and the unavoidable interest conflict, the managers and the stakeholders always game on the implementation of accounting contracts. The managers＇ reputation capital works as the incredible punishment space, which makes it possible to effectively implement the accounting contract.

关 键 词：信誉资本 会计契约 博弈 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]