存在消费者搜寻的双寡头企业广告竞争模型  

An Advertising Model of Duopoly with Consumer Searching

作　　者：朱启红[1] 顾锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2009年第3期47-49,共3页Shanghai Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572102)

摘　　要：针对泰勒尔（1997）广告竞争模型中不允许消费者搜寻这一问题，应用两阶段博弈模型，建立了一个存在消费者搜寻的双寡头广告竞争模型，模型中的消费者具有偏好异质性，且搜寻成本企影响企业产品价格和广告水平。结果表明，在发现成本高的情况下，均衡是两企业定价水平相同，广告水平则随消费者保留值的增大先增大再减小。Aiming at the problem that the Tirole （1997）＇ analysis of informative advertising , with the twophase gaming model applied to it. This paper puts forward the informative advertising model based on consumers＇information searching in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences, and consumersr costs of information searching can influence the product price and advertising level of enterprises. In the discussion of model equilibrium, the conclusions are： when high discovery cost, in equilibrium, duopoly have the same price and advertising level will increase firstly then decrease if the reservation value increases.

关 键 词：消费者搜寻 发现成本 广告水平 保留值 

分 类 号：F252.3[经济管理—国民经济]