美国次贷危机中的信息不对称研究  

A Perspective on the Information Asymmetry in the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis

作　　者：沈云良[1] 刘建国[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,200237

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2009年第6期67-76,共10页Shanghai Journal of Economics

摘　　要：本文着重对次级债形成流程中的各类信息不对称进行分析。首先,介绍了次级借款人和投资银行之间的信息不对称,分析了投资银行如何利用信息不对称设计掠夺性贷款。其次,提出了次级债市场最初由于次级债购买者的信息弱势而存在逆向选择难题,并进而分析了难题的解决途径和评级。再次,就次级债和传统企业债在风险特征上的区别阐述了投资者因信息弱势而受到的误导。最后,分析了次贷经纪商同贷款公司之间的信息不对称所导致欺诈行为以及次级债发行商同金融服务机构之间的信息不对称所导致的道德风险问题。The essay focuses on analyzing the information asymmetry in the process of Sub-prime debt ＇s formation. First, the essay introduces the information asymmetry between Sub-prime borrowers and investment banks and analyses how investment banks design predatory loan. Second, the essay proposes that, because of the information asymmetry between Sub-prime debt issuers and Sub-prime debt buyers, there is adverse selection in the Sub-prime debt market, and tells the ways that solve it. Third, the essay differentiates Sub-prime debt and corporation debt on the risk characteristics, and tells how investors were misled by rating agency because of their information disadvantage. Last, the essay analyses the fraud caused by information asymmetry between Sub-prime mortgage brokers and loan companies and the moral hazard problem caused by the information asymmetry between Sub-prime debt issuers and Financial services companies.

关 键 词：次级住房抵押贷款 次级债 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F112.7[经济管理—国际贸易]