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出 处:《系统工程理论与实践》2009年第6期39-45,共7页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
摘 要:研究了制造商的生产成本增加量为对称信息和非对称信息条件下的收入共享契约,结果表明:在对称信息条件下,收入共享契约可以达到系统协调,但在非对称信息条件下,为了激励制造商,销售商不得不对制造商的生产成本增加量的不可观测性付出成本,导致利润下降,而制造商由于拥有私有信息使得利润增加,整个供应链系统不能实现协调最优,只能得到具有帕累托改善的次优结果.最后通过算例进行了说明.Although reducing order lead-time can improve demand forecast accuracy of the dealer, it may increase production cost of manufacturer. The revenue-sharing contract under supply chain with symmetric information structure was firstly discussed. Then the revenue-sharing contract under asymmetry manufacturer's production cost increment information was discussed. The study conclusions show that revenue -sharing contract under symmetry information can realize supply chain coordination. But under asymmetry information, in order to stimulate the manufacturer, the dealer has to pay additional cost for the unknown production cost increment of manufacturer, which results in the reduction of dealer's profit, while the profit of manufacturer increase due to holding private information. The whole supply chain coordination can not be achieved, only the result with Pareto efficiency is gained that is inferior to optimization. In the end, a numerical example is given to illustrate the correlative conclusions.
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