集体声誉、可置信承诺与契约执行——以网上拍卖中的卖家商盟为例  

Collective Reputation,Credible Commitment and Enforcement:The Case of Seller Coalition in China's Online Auction Market

作　　者：吴德胜[1,2] 李维安 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心 [2]南开大学商学院现代管理研究所,300071

出　　处：《经济研究》2009年第6期142-154,共13页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：自然科学基金项目(70532001;70802030);天津市2008社科规划项目(TJGL08-079)提供的资助

摘　　要：网上拍卖中存在着比较严重的囚徒困境问题,而电子商务方面的法律也不是很完善,在法律不完善的环境下,卖方和拍卖网站建立了商盟等制度来增进买卖双方之间的信任。商盟以其集体声誉作为抵押向买家承诺商盟成员不会欺骗卖家;如果商盟成员有欺骗行为,商盟会对成员进行处罚。商盟的存在增强了买家可以实施的惩罚力度,加强了声誉机制的作用。本文从而说明了在公共秩序缺失的情况下,私人部门自发地设计制度来约束自己的行为,提供可置信承诺,从而保证了契约执行;私人秩序在一定程度上可以起到替代公共秩序的作用。This paper analyzes the function of seller coalition on online auction site-Taobao in contract enforcement. Severe prisoner＇ s dilemma exists in online auction sites. Sellers and Taobao established seller coalition to solve this problem as response. Seller coalition can use its collective reputation as hostage to undertake credible commitment to buyers： sellers belonging to a coalition will not cheat buyers; if a seller cheats buyers, coalition will punish him. Coalition systems increase punishment buyers can inflict on sellers and enhance the role of reputation mechanism. Under certain condition, commitment undertaken by coalition is credible. This paper explores how private parties establish institution to self-discipline and provide credible commitment, and therefore enhance the enforcement.

关 键 词：集体声誉 可置信承诺 网上拍卖 商盟 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济] D922.3[政治法律—法学]