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作 者:贾俊秀[1,2]
机构地区:[1]西安电子科技大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710071 [2]西安电子科技大学理学院,陕西西安710071
出 处:《系统工程学报》2009年第3期299-306,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571049)
摘 要:针对由多个生产商和多个零售商构成的供应链网络,分析其中生产商间生产能力的竞争、零售商间订购量和零售价的竞争问题,建立最大化期望利润的竞争模型.在零售价对随机需求有影响的条件下,证明了如下结论:多生产商和多零售商构成的网络中,零售商间的博弈实际为分别对各品牌产品的博弈,每个博弈中零售商期望利润函数的极大值点存在;由多个供应商和两个零售商组成的供应链网络中,在一定条件下,零售商间存在均衡定价和订货策略,并给出了最优反应函数;如果批发价格是生产数量的函数,即生产商不采用价格歧视策略,在某种条件下生产商间存在均衡生产数量.最后用一个数值算例分析了模型中的几种竞争关系和成员企业期望利润的变化.For a supply chain network with multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers, this paper analyzes production capacity competition between manufacturers, and orders quantities and pricing competitions between retailers by building a model with maximizing expected profit. Following conclusions are proven under the condition that demand is price sensitive. The game among retailers is actually the game to different brands in the supply chain. And the retailers can obtain the maximum expected profit in each game. There exist Nash equilibrium of the pricing and ordering policies for the retailers under a certain condition and the optimal response functions are given. If the wholesale price is the function of all manufacturers' production quantities, that is, manufacturers do not use the pricing discrimination policy, then they also have equilibrium production quantity under a certain condition. Finally, a numerical example is presented for analyzing some competition relations in the model and the changes of the expected profits for the members in the supply chain network.
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