基于能力不对称的企业技术创新合作模型  

Modeling the techno-innovative cooperation between enterprises with asymmetric capability

作　　者：蒋军锋[1,2] 盛昭瀚[1] 王修来[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093 [2]解放军博士后管理信息中心,江苏南京210002

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2009年第3期335-342,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672089;70571034;70731002);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20050700009);中国博士后基金资助项目(20080431083)

摘　　要：在引入创新能力与运作能力不对称的前提下,考虑创新产品市场替代率的变化,将企业合作创新决策模型描述为0-1混合规划问题,并将其变形为博弈论的形式,在此基础上,考察了创新能力,运作能力及市场替代率变动对企业合作决策的影响.研究表明:1)市场替代率的增大降低了企业之间的合作可能;2)运作能力的提高可以提高本企业的合作可能,但是会降低伙伴企业的合作可能;3)创新能力的提高同样提高本企业的合作可能,但也会降低伙伴企业的合作可能;4)在非对称能力情况下,创新卡特尔目标最大化并不能保证各个体企业的合作目标得以实现,非对称情况下的企业之间的合作需要收益转移机制来提高合作水平.Under the condition that the innovative capability is asymmetrical with the operative capability and considering the change of the market substitution rate of the innovation product, a decision model for enterprise＇ s cooperation on innovation can be described as a 0-1 type integrated programming. On these bases, the effect of the variation of innovative capability, operative capability and market substitution rate on enterprise＇ s cooperation decision can be examined. This paper shows ： 1 ） an increase in market substitution rate will decrease the cooperative possibility among enterprises ; 2） the strengthening of operative capability raises the cooperative possibility of the enterprise itself, whereas that of its associates will be reduced ; 3 ） the strengthening of innovative capability raises the cooperative possibility of the enterprise itself, whereas that of its associates will be reduced; 4 ） in the case of asymmetric capability, the realization of the cooperative objective of every individual enterprise will not be guaranteed by maximizing the Cartel innovation objective. In this case the cooperation requires return transferring mechanisms to promote cooperation level.

关 键 词：创新能力 运作能力 合作创新 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]