城市公共服务市场化与定价管制  

The Marketing of City Infrastructure:Investment Game,Behavior Choice and Regulation

作　　者：王传荣[1] 安丰东[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东财政学院 [2]山东财政学院经济学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2009年第7期109-117,共9页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：投资博弈模型表明,在城市公共服务产品的价格无法预知的条件下,只有给投资商预定的利润率才能吸引资本进入,而预定的利润率却进一步降低了成本激励。基础设施供给厂商和规制者合谋的子博弈完美纳什均衡表明,预定的投资收益率管制并非激励相容机制,直接管制定价反映出城市公共服务产品产业的低效率、高成本、高价格状态,远远偏离于政府管制的消费者福利最优化的初衷。On the condition that infrastucture price are not predicted, investment game model demonstrate that all kinds of capital will not enter for investment unless there are scheduled profit margins, which will reduce the stimulating of decreasing cost. Sub- game perfect Nash equilibrium between the supplier of infras- tructure firm and regulator manifests cost addition pricing method is not stimulating compatible system, al- though it is more suitable for the marketing price innovation of our country. Directly regulating pricing reflects low efficiency, high cost and price, which deviates from the original intention of consumer＇ s welfare opti- raison of government regulation.

关 键 词：市场化 投资博弈 成本加成 城市公共服务产品 

分 类 号：F294[经济管理—国民经济]