付费搜索拍卖建模与两类排名机制比较研究  

Research on Modeling of Sponsored Search Auctions and Comparison Between Two Ranking Mechanisms

作　　者：姜晖 王浣尘[1] 关树永[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]上海海事大学,上海200135

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2009年第3期142-149,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70450001);教育部哲学社会科学重点攻关项目(06JZD0021)

摘　　要：在综合付费搜索拍卖静态博弈研究成果的基础上,通过归纳广告主估价函数结构和梳理拍卖规则,建立了较为一般性的付费搜索拍卖模型,定义了GSP机制下付费搜索拍卖的纳什均衡条件和无嫉妒均衡条件并阐述了二者之间的关系,证明了有效竞价排名相对于单纯竞价排名具有更好的均衡配置效率,但是不能保证搜索引擎收益一定得到提高,最后通过数值分析进一步指出,只有广告主相关度因子存在较大差别时,有效竞价排名相对于单纯竞价排名的优势才能得以体现。Based on the latest research on sponsored search auctions by the methodology of static games theory, this article builds a common model of sponsored search auctions by concluding on the value function of advertisers and settling the auctions rules as well. After stating the Nash equilibrium condition, the envy-free equilibrium condition and the relations between the two, it proves that while ranking by income better off than ranking by bids in terms of equilibrium, it does not necessarily bring an increase to the search engines. An arithmetic example is given in the end.

关 键 词：付费搜索拍卖 单纯竞价排名 有效竞价排名 GSP拍卖 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F724.59