终极产权与公司负债行为--来自民营上市公司面板数据的经验证据  

Ultimate Ownership and Corporate Debt Financing Behavior

作　　者：张文龙[1] 郭泽光[2] 杨杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]山西财经大学会计学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2009年第6期75-77,161,共3页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文利用我国股权分置改革导致股权结构变动的契机,对我国民营上市公司面板数据检验了公司所有权结构与负债行为之间的关系。结果表明,内部股权比例和公司负债水平正相关,忽略非观测效应的影响将导致错误的研究结论。我国特殊的制度环境导致公司具有股权融资偏好,配股和增发对利润的严格要求导致利润剧烈波动的公司只能利用债务融资,这造成了我国上市公司经营风险和负债水平正相关。This paper explores an empirical research on the relationship between corporate ownership structure and debt financing behavior by using the panel data of Chinese private listed companies based on the opportunity given by the Share- trading reform in China. We find a strong positive association between internal shareholding proportion and debt level. If ignoring the unobserved effect, we might get a false conclusion. Chinese special institution environment can lead to the Corporate prefer to equity financing. Both Rights Offering and Seasoned Equity Offerings require profit objects that make companies experienced earning fluctuations such that debt becomes the only financing way. It is the reasons above that result in a positive relationship between the list company's business risk and debt level. Other factors that empirically affect capital structure in some countries have the same impacts on the Chinese Private Listed companies.

关 键 词：终极产权 代理成本 负债行为 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F275