双边道德风险与风险投资的资本结构  

Double moral hazard and the theory of capital structure of venture capital financing

作　　者：郭文新[1] 曾勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2009年第3期119-131,共13页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70540022);教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目(教技司[2005]2号);电子科技大学青年基金项目(JX03142)

摘　　要：研究创业者和风险投资家双边道德风险下的融资合约,创业者无初始财富,风险投资家在提供资本支持的同时也扶助企业发展.模型存在贝叶斯均衡解的充分必要条件是,双方的努力互补,且从极大似然原理看,创业者在企业的发展中发挥了关键性的作用.由此内在地导出了风险投资企业的资本结构,仅在某个利润水平之上创业者才能获得普通股,而风险投资家持有可转换优先股.This paper analyzes financial contract between an entrepreneur without initial wealth and a venture capitalist （VC） who invests venture and assists its development as well, so the double moral hazard problem exists between them. Under the sufficient and necessary conditions that the two parties make complementary efforts, and from the perspective of the maximum likelihood, entrepreneurs play a key role in developing the venture, the financing problem＇ s solution arises as a Bayesian equilibrium. Therefore, this paper derives endogenously the capital structure of venture capital financing in which the entrepreneur gets common stocks only when the profit exceeds a certain level and the VC holds a convertible preferred stock.

关 键 词：风险投资 双边道德风险 资本结构 可转换优先股 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]