零售产业壁垒:采购角度的博弈分析研究  

Analysis on Procurement Game between Super retailer and Entry Retailer

作　　者：匡奕军[1] 李宏余[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2009年第3期85-91,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

摘　　要：假设零售行业里只存在两个零售商:巨头零售商和想进入的新进零售商。新进零售商刚进入时的运作目的不是短期及时盈利,而是等待电子商务概念和网上营销概念的成熟而卖出一个好价钱,或作为制造商的另一个渠道而减少对巨头零售商的依赖。巨头零售商极大化自身利润,新进零售商则极大化自身存活概率。在面对需求高度不确定情况时,考虑巨头零售商与新进零售商之间的采购博弈情况。模型结果表明,巨头零售商与新进零售商永远不会出现同时竞争的现象,总是一个处于主导地位而另一个处于跟随地位。在与巨头零售商的竞争中,新进零售商决不会选择退出市场,相反,巨头零售商如果在成本上不占有任何优势的话,它们会选择不进入。Compared with profit-maximizing target for the super retailer, the purpose for the entry retailer to seek survival probability maximization is supposed. In reality, some entry retailers run business not for pursuing shortterm profit but for hoping for a high price in future when EC is mature or internet marketing becomes popular. Even some entry retail companies are owned by manufacturers to be less dependent on the super retailer. When the demand is volatile, the procurement game between the super retailer and the entry retailer is analyzed. The result shows that the simultaneous entry is never an equilibrium state because the entry retailer always leads the super retailer or vice versa. In competition with the super retailer, the entry retailer is never forced out of the market while the super retailer often prefer not to enter at all if it is at a cost disadvantage.

关 键 词：新进零售商 巨头零售商 存活概率 采购博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]