制造商数量折扣策略和零售商广告投入博弈分析  

Game Analyses of Cooperative Advertising Under Quantity Discount

作　　者：张廷龙[1] 梁樑[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽师范大学经济管理学院,安徽芜湖241000 [2]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2009年第3期99-104,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金资助项目(70525001);安徽省教育厅自然科学研究项目(KJ2008B149);安徽省教育厅人文社科研究项目(2008SK083)

摘　　要：广告投入不仅会提高需求期望也会对需求方差产生影响,方差可能不变、与期望同比增大、增速大于期望。针对一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两层供应链系统,研究制造商如何利用目标数量折扣机理来激励零售商的广告投入和订货协调,以改善供应链的渠道效率。Interest in the single-period problem （SPP） remains unabated and many extensions to it have been proposed in the last decade. An important aspect of the SPP is the effect of advertising on sales. In order to promote sales, an investment in advertisement is very popular for manufacture and agent. In this paper, we extend the SPP to a case in which advertising leads to increases in sales. The buyer＇ s optimal advertising is discussed under manufacturer＇s discount policy. Furthermore, we investigate the optimal discount offered by the manufacturer to improve the system profit using game theory. We assume that the mean demand is increasing, concave in advertising expenditure and address three cases of demand variance as a function of advertising expenditure ： （ 1 ） demand has constant variance, （2） demand has constant coefficient of variation, and （3） demand has an increasing coefficient of variation.

关 键 词：管理科学 单周期产品 广告 折扣 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]