预算软约束下的银行高管薪酬机制分析  

Executive Compensation in Banking under the Soft Budget Constraint

作　　者：丁大巍[1] 王珺[1] 宋逢明[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2009年第3期105-110,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

摘　　要：为了探讨预算软约束对于银行高管薪酬机制的影响,本文构建了一个委托-代理模型,来描述在政府、银行的董事会和高级管理层之间的博弈中,预算软约束的条件是如何改变各参与人行为,从而影响高级管理层最优的薪酬结构,表现为薪酬-业绩敏感度。模型中,预算软约束的条件体现在当银行陷入危机时,政府有可能采取措施挽救银行使其免于破产,研究发现银行高管的薪酬-业绩敏感度与这种可能性成负相关关系。由于高级管理层持股比例是影响薪酬-业绩敏感度的重要因素,因此研究结论对于当前银行业制定管理层长期激励计划具有一定的指导意义。This paper presents a principal-agent model, describing how the soft budget constraint in banking affects each participant＇s behavior in the game among the government, the bank＇s board of directors and executives, which in turn decides the optimal compensation structure for bank＇s executives. The soft budget constraint implies that the government has some probability to bail out a bank in trouble. We find that the larger is this probability, the smaller is the pay-performance sensitivity for executives, standing for their compensation structure. Since the pay-performance sensitivity can be partly explained as an important fraction of stocks held by the executives, the conclusion of this study is heuristic when planning the longterm incentive mechanism for the executives in banking.

关 键 词：公司治理 预算软约束 委托-代理模型 薪酬-业绩敏感度 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]