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机构地区:[1]武汉大学社会保障研究中心,湖北武汉430072 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072
出 处:《西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版)》2009年第3期27-32,共6页Journal of Xidian University:Social Science Edition
基 金:教育部人文社会科学研究项目<新型农村合作医疗制度研究>(编号05JJD840009)支持。主持人:武汉大学社会保障研究中心主任邓大松
摘 要:文章运用公共管理学与保险学、投资学等相关理论,对商业保险公司参与新农合后,保险公司"盈利性"与社会保险"公共性"的矛盾,以及保险公司"赔本赚吆喝"行为的合理性作了解读。认为新农合中保险公司介入提供管理服务的行为与国际上养老社会保障私有化改革的动因是一致的,都是为了追求效率。而且,利用Markowitz的E-V(均值-方差)模型分析表明,保险公司参与新农合优化了投资组合,提高了获利机会,是理性的投资决策。This paper deals with the contradictions of commercial insurance company's profitability and social insurance's public nature, as well as the explanations for commercial insurance company's participation without benefit, based on the theories of public management, insurance, investment etc. It is assumed that commercial insurance company's offering of management service in the New Rural Cooperative Medical System has the same motivations as the privatization of social security pension reform internationally: the pursuit of efficiency. Meanwhile, the analysis on Markowitz's E-V (Expectation-Variance) model indicates that the involvement of commercial insurance company in the New Rural Cooperative Medical System can optimize its portfolio, enhance its chance to earn profit. It is rational decision-making for commercial insurance company to participate in the New Rural Cooperative Medical System.
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