力量不对等供应链VMI模式演化机理研究  

Research on Evolutionary Mechanism of VMI Supply Chain with Unbalanced Bargaining Power

作　　者：赵道致[1] 秦娟娟[1] 韩敬稳[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《西安电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第3期92-97,共6页Journal of Xidian University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"VMI模式下力量不对等供应链Pareto改进研究"(70771073)

摘　　要：从演化博弈论的角度探讨了力量不对等供应链供应商管理库存(vendor managed inventory,VMI)在实施前及实施过程中的有关问题。首先采用单种群演化模型,分析了供应商是否实施模式创新,投资VMI模式,其次采用双种群演化模型,分析了在VMI模式实施过程中,零售商和供应商合作关系的双种群演化均衡,及影响均衡的参数。The implementation of vendor managed inventory model in the unbalanced bargaining power supply chain is discussed from the perspective of the evolutionary game theory. Firstly, the model of single group evolutionary game is used to analyze the situation whether the supplier invest changes the traditional inventory model into VMI. On the other hand, double groups＇ evolutionary game theory is employed to demonstrate the equilibrium of the cooperation relationship between the retailer and the supplier in the process of VMI＇s implementation. Finally, the factors which influence the stability of the VMI system is analyzed, emphasizing and simulating the influence of profit discrimination rate on the stability of the system＇s evolution, which provides the scientific basis for exploring the profit and risk sharing mechanism in VMI from the aspect of evolutionary game theory.

关 键 词：VENDOR managed INVENTORY 单种群演化模型 双种群演化模型 利润分配系数 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]