契约型区域规划的困境  

The dilemma of contractual regional planning

作　　者：李广斌[1] 王勇[2] 黄明华[1] 谷人旭[3] 

机构地区：[1]苏州科技大学地理与资源科学系 [2]苏州科技大学建筑与城市规划学院 [3]华东师范大学资源与环境科学学院

出　　处：《城市问题》2009年第6期98-102,共5页Urban Problems

基　　金：江苏省高校自然科学基础研究项目(08KJB170008);2008年度住房和城乡建设部软科学研究项目(2008-R2-18)

摘　　要：在行政性分权的市场环境下,规避或漠视地方间利益冲突是指令型区域规划失灵的根本原因。契约型规划强调规划是"集体行动"的"契约",倡导构建一个不同利益主体表达、交流的平台,以减少规划实施过程中"各自为政"的阻力。基于利益博弈的视角,分析了区域规划的跨区性、综合性特征与规划实施的可操作性之间的内在矛盾,指出随着地方政府数量和规划内容的增加,区域规划成为集体行动契约的可能性越小,其实施的可操作性越低,契约型区域规划难以使城市合作摆脱"囚徒困境"。In the context of market mechanism of administrative decentralization, ignoring the conflicts between multiple interest groups is the essential reason that causes the failure of traditional regional planning. Contractual regional planning advocates building up the platform of dialogues and communica- tions between different interests at the phases of drawing up planning, emphasizes that planning is the democratic contract of Collective Actions for reducing the resistance of planning implementation. This article delineates the scene of N local governments＇ game on M issues for regional planning, analyses the intrinsic contradictions between the feasibility of regional planning implementation and its essential characteristics including interregion and comprehensiveness, and argues that contractual regional planning can＇ t free inter-city from Prisoners＇ Dilemma.

关 键 词：契约型区域规划 利益博弈 地方政府 

分 类 号：TU984.2[建筑科学—城市规划与设计]