基于混合战略均衡双寡头航空公司定价博弈研究  

Game Theory Study on Dual Oligopoly Airlines Competition Pricing Based on Incomplete Static Model

作　　者：肖艳颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国民航管理干部学院,北京100102

出　　处：《中国民航大学学报》2009年第3期48-52,共5页Journal of Civil Aviation University of China

摘　　要：利用产品差异化理论和博弈理论,建立了双寡头航空公司市场竞争定价的不完全信息静态博弈模型,假定双方经营相同航线、选择相同机型、面临相同旅客,而在产品价格和服务水平方面存在差异性,在文献[1]中证明了这种博弈不存在纯策略均衡,按照纳什均衡解存在性理论,对混合战略均衡进行求证,得出结论:双方价格和服务水平的大小关系一致时,其市场份额和期望利润的关系与之相同;双方两因素关系随机变化时,其市场份额及期望利润同其变化程度有关,即结果不确定。Referencing product differential theory and game theory, this paper establishes a game theory static pricing model with incomplete information for airlines competition, supposing that the two airlines have the same routes, the same passengers, the same airplanes, but they use different price and service level, following the analysis of pure strategy equilibrium in the former paper, see reference 1, it also proves that there is mix Nash equilibrium and draws a conclusion： when the price and service have the same relation, we could get the same relation in terms of market share and expected profit, while when the relation is uncertain, so does the relation of market share and expected profit.

关 键 词：航空公司产品定价 博弈 产品差异化 纯战略均衡 混合战略均衡 不完全信息静态博弈 

分 类 号：F562.5[经济管理—产业经济]