风险投资企业的声誉机制分析  

Analysis the Reputation Mechanism of Venture Capital Firm

作　　者：勾永尧[1] 王发钱[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南科技大学经济管理学院,四川绵阳621010 [2]长庆油田分公司公共关系处,陕西西安710018

出　　处：《中国市场》2009年第19期125-126,共2页China Market

摘　　要：风险投资家在整个风险投资运作体系中起着核心作用,投资者通过显性契约来激励约束风险投资家,然而创业投资的报酬分配机制并不是一种有效的激励机制,因为它未能使投资者的效用达到最大化,为了弥补报酬激励合同的不完备性,有必要通过起着隐性激励作用的声誉机制来发挥作用。The venture capitalist with high qualities is the soul of venture capital, and the investors stimulus or restrict venture capitalist through obvious contract mechanism. But the reward assignment mechanism of venture capital isn＇t the effective incentive one because it has not been able to enable investor＇s benefits to achieve the maximization. In order to make up the incompleteness of reward mechanism, so it is necessary to function through the reputation mechanism with recessive incentive.

关 键 词：报酬机制 风险投资企业 声誉 激励 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学] F224