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机构地区:[1]中国土地勘测规划院国土资源部土地利用重点实验室,北京100035 [2]中国地质大学(北京)土地科学技术学院,北京100083
出 处:《中国国土资源经济》2009年第6期29-31,45,共4页Natural Resource Economics of China
基 金:2007年度国土资源部百名优秀科技人才计划(B080601-01);"十一五"国家科技支撑计划"区域土地利用协同耦合与规划关键技术"(2006BAB15B04);国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BZZ015)
摘 要:目前,土地集约利用问题已经受到各界的广泛关注。然而,现有土地尤其是农村居民点,存在土地集约利用进程缓慢,用地效率低下等一系列问题。问题的根源在于参与土地集约利用的各主体博弈目标的不一致性与缺乏相应的利益整合机制。突破传统的土地集约利用的研究视角,基于政府、开发商和农户等不同利益主体及其利益目标,构建不同层次的博弈模型,计算和比较各主体得益。研究表明,只有使其利益趋同,增加抵制与协调成本,才能实现社会利益最大化目标。Nowadays,intensive land use has been widespread concerned by various social circles.However,the existing land,especially the rural residential area,exist many problems,such as the intensive land use process is slow,inefficient land use and other issues.And the root of the problem lies in the fact that there is neither consistency game target among the different subjects,nor the corresponding mechanism for interest integration.In view of existing situation,the paper argues that based on the different interest subjects with different objectives,including the government,developers and farmers,various game models should be built so as to calculate and compare the benefits obtained by these subjects.It shows that only when the interests is reaching unanimity,and increase the cost of resistance and coordination can the maximization of the social interests be realized.
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