基于单周期产品的广告投入供应链博弈分析  

Game analyses of advertising in supply chains for a single-period product

作　　者：张廷龙[1] 梁樑[2] 凌六一[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽师范大学经济管理学院,安徽芜湖241000 [2]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2009年第6期658-664,672,共8页JUSTC

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金(70525001);安徽省自然科学基金(090416244);安徽省教育厅自然科学研究项目(KJ2008B149)资助

摘　　要：在供应链管理环境下,供应商和经销商关于广告成本的分担是一件具有挑战的工作.对单周期产品而言,广告的促销作用表现为需求期望和方差的变化上,而期望和方差之间不同的变化模式对策略的选择又会带来一定的影响.以一个供应商和一个经销商就单周期产品广告策略为背景,以费用分担为供应商主要契约形式,研究供应商的最优分担比率及其对经销商的广告投入的激励.考察了需求方差和期望关于广告投入不同反应模式对供应链双方决策的影响.最后探讨了如何结合供应商回购策略,进行供应链契约设计以达到渠道最优.Investment in advertising is very popular in the business world. Sharing of cost and profit is an important issue for suppliers and sellers in a supply chain. For a single-period product, advertising expenditures may not only increase the expected demand but also affect the variation. The supplier＇s cost sharing policy is investigated for the case in which demand has a variance as a function of advertising expenditure. The ways in which the optimal policies of two parties vary with the increasing coefficient of variation are discussed. Finally, the system optimal policy with supplier return price is developed to show that the optimal system＇s advertising expenditure and profit can still be achieved without cooperation.

关 键 词：供应链协调 单周期产品 广告 广告费用分担 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]