宪法失序与对行政权剩余的规制——以执行权的变迁为视角  

Constitutional Disorder and Regulation of the Surplus of Executive Power:From the Perspective of the Evolution of Executive Power

作　　者：程关松[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学法学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《法律科学（西北政法大学学报）》2009年第4期41-52,共12页Science of Law：Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law

基　　金：国家社科基金重点课题"以人为本与马克思主义法学基础理论的创新"(项目批准号:06AFX002);国家社科基金重点课题"党的领导;人民当家作主和依法治国有机统一研究"(项目批准号:07AFX007)

摘　　要：我国现行宪法认为行政权是一种执行法律的权力,没有政治功能派分。但在宪政实践中,行政权既有执行功能,又有政治功能,其政治功能缺乏合法性。行政权的扩张使宪法失序,主要原因是现有宪法没有一套规制行政权非正式来源的有效方案。宪法沉默之处就是宪法危机之所。行政权的非正式来源有其必然性,外在的、事前或事后的、间断的宪法制约机制不足以规制行政权,必须有内在的、事中的、连续的宪法制约机制予以配合。规范主义宪法的有效性必须向生活领域开放;功能主义宪法观的合法性必须获得法治化建构。行政法治模式宜以规范主义宪法为基础,以功能主义为补充。行政的开放性、公民参与、法律程序是内在宪法制约机制的要素。The existing constitution maintains that the executive power, which executes the legal authority, does not have political functions to distribute. But in the constitutionalism practice, the executive power has both executive and political functions, however, its political function lacks the legitimacy. The expansion of executive power makes the constitution disorder, and the primary reason is the existing constitution does not have a set of effective plan regulating the unofficial origin of executive power. The unofficial origin of executive power has its inevitability, the ex ante or ex post and the interrupted constitution restriction mechanism could not regulate executive power, and the coordination of inherent, synchronic and continual constitution restriction mechanism is greatly demanded.

关 键 词：执行权 剩余性范畴 宪法失序 民主制行政 

分 类 号：D921[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学] D90[政治法律—法学]