基于前景理论的有奖发票机制设计  

The Design of Prize-offered Invoice System Based on the Prospect Theory

作　　者：严红梅[1] 王震[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学财税学院,成都610074 [2]西南财经大学金融学院,成都611130

出　　处：《云南财经大学学报》2009年第4期65-70,共6页Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：基于行为经济学的前景理论,从有限理性、不完全信息等现实假定出发,分析了有奖发票的作用机理,并指出顾客行为是有奖发票机制设计的关注重点。最后,根据顾客行为的影响因素,从税务机关机制设计的角度,提供了完善中国有奖发票制度的现实选择。Based on the prospect theory of behavioral economics, the authors analyze the mechanism of prize -offered invoice from the suppositions bounded rationality and incomplete information, and point out that importance should be put on customer behaviors in designing prize -offered invoice system. Finally, the paper provides a realistic choice for China to perfect its prize- offered invoice system according to the influential factors of customer behaviors from the angle of system design of tax authorities.

关 键 词：前景理论 有奖发票 机制设计 行为经济学 

分 类 号：F810.422[经济管理—财政学]