排污管制中的授权监督与合谋  

Delegated Monitoring and Collusion in Pollution Regulation

作　　者：郭新帅[1] 缪柏其[1] 方世建[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科技大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2009年第4期24-29,共6页China Population,Resources and Environment

摘　　要：伴随着我国经济的高速增长而来的环境污染问题日益突出,如何确保政府制定的环境管制政策得到有效实施变得至关重要。现实中,管制机构总是通过授权给各级官员去实施其管制政策的,这种授权为官员与被管制者之间的合谋创造了条件。本文运用一个博弈模型研究了政府授权官员对企业排污进行监督的情形下,作为监督者的政府官员与企业主之间的合谋行为对企业的排污量以及监督者的监督努力所产生的影响。模型的结论表明,均衡时,在监督者的监督强度与企业的排污量之间存在此消彼涨的关系。本文的结论具有明确的政策含义,政府可以通过政策严惩监督者的失职行为、降低监督者的监督成本、提高监督者的议价能力等措施来增加监督者的监督强度、降低企业的排污动机,进而更有效地达到保护环境的目标。Environmental pollution problems accompanying with China＇s high-speed economic growth are becoming more and more serious. How to implement the environmental regulation pohcies effectively is vital for coping with these problems. In reality, it is a rule that the regulation agency delegates its officials to implement the regulation policies, which provides favorable conditions for collusion between officials and those to be regulated to occur. This article, employing a game-theoretical model, investigates the impact of the collusion between the monitor and the firm owner on the pollution level of the firm and the effort executed by the monitor when government delegates its officer to monitor the pollution level of the firm. The results show that, in equilibrium, there is a trade-off between the monitoring intensity and the pollution level. These results have obvious policy implications. By penalizing the inspector＇s negligence of duty more heavily, decreasing the monitoring cost, or improving the bargaining power of the monitor, etc., the government can increase the effort level of the monitor, curb the firm owner＇s incentives for pollution, and promote its objectives on environmental protection efficiently.

关 键 词：环境管制 授权 监督 合谋 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学] F205