Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on highly clustered community networks  

作　　者：刘永奎 李智 陈小杰 王龙 

机构地区：[1]Center for Complex Systems, Department of Automatic Control Engineering, Xidian University [2]State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University

出　　处：《Chinese Physics B》2009年第7期2623-2628,共6页中国物理B（英文版）

基　　金：Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos 70671079, 60674050, 60736022 and 60528007);National 973 Program (Grant No 2002CB312200);National 863 Program (Grant No 2006AA04Z258);11-5 project (Grant NoA2120061303)

摘　　要：This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.

关 键 词：prisoner＇s dilemma COOPERATION clustering coefficient community structure 

分 类 号：TP393.09[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]