坏账准备计提的盈余管理动机  

Incentives of Earnings Management in Provision for Bad Debts

作　　者：蒋基路[1] 王华[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2009年第7期116-124,共9页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：以应收账款占总资产比重最大的三类行业的上市公司为样本，利用MeNichols和Wilson（1968）模型对坏账计提和核销的联系来推导单项操控性应计，并以此度量盈余管理，检验了研究样本在2002—2005年计提坏账准备的盈余管理动机。通过事件、市场和监管三个层面的盈余管理动机，对该单项操控性应计进行解释，发现在坏账准备计提会计程序的选择上，最主要的盈余管理动机是规避ST监管政策，此外也存在非ST公司为避免向市场公布坏消息，通过负向操控性应计调增盈余。The authors investigated listed companies from three industries which have the highest weight of accounts receivables in total assets. The authors used McNichols ＆ Wilson（1988） ＇s model to measure the solitary discretionary accruals of provision for bad debts in year 2002 - 2005. Through the different explanation power of three levels of earnings management： Event, Market and Regulation,the authors found that avoiding ST was the most significant incentive, and there are certain non- ST companies using negative discretionary accruals to increase earnings, escaping from bad news to the market.

关 键 词：坏账准备计提 操控性应计 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]