“旋转门效应”、审计独立性与政府监管  

‘Revolving Door’ Effect Audit Independence and Government Supervision

作　　者：吕凡[1] 余玉苗[2] 

机构地区：[1]贵州大学管理学院,贵州贵阳550025 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2009年第7期51-52,60,共3页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金的资助(项目资助号为70572063)

摘　　要：20世纪90年代以来,独立审计市场上逐渐出现了一种现象即会计师事务所的审计人员转到客户公司任职,且进入客户公司后仍与原事务所保持"亲密"的联系,由此形成了旋转门效应。旋转门效应能够帮助事务所在未来的竞争中获得新业务并规避审计风险,但其负面影响是可能对审计师的独立性产生影响和加剧审计市场垄断。本文对此提出了相应的监管对策。Since 1990s,a phenomenon observed in the audit market is that audit firms proactively help their alumni into the boardrooms of existing (and prospective) clients before the cpa leaves audit firms. Audit firms alumni keep intimate relation with audit firm which lead to so-called 'Revolving Door' effect. This effect can help audit firms obtain new business and avoid audit risk. But it's negative effect is that it may affect audit independence and intensify monopoly in audit market. Finally,we give some supervision suggestions about this problem.

关 键 词：旋转门效应 审计独立性 政府监管 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]