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机构地区:[1]西南财经大学会计学院
出 处:《中国会计评论》2009年第1期29-52,共24页China Accounting Review
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(70802050);国家自然科学基金项目(70472051);西南财经大学"211工程"三期项目与青年教师成长项目的资助
摘 要:本文从控股股东角度探讨内幕交易在控制权转移中所发挥的作用。利用一个模型分析表明内幕交易起到了补偿控制权转移中控股股东所付出代价的作用,扩大了控制权转移交易的达成区域,使控制权转移事件更容易发生,控制权转移事件出现频率更高。在此基础上,利用上市公司(1997—2001)样本验证了:(1)我国上市公司控制权转移过程中存在内幕交易行为。(2)控制权转移中控股股东与内幕交易行为有关:控制权转移中控股股东付出越多,内幕交易行为越严重;原控股股东控股比例越高,内幕交易行为越严重;现金方式交易时内幕交易行为比非现金方式交易时更加严重。本文研究结果表明我国上市公司控制权转移中由于控股股东可以利用内幕交易补偿所付出的代价,从而使得控制权转移易于发生,这在一定程度上推动了自1997年起的上市公司控制权转移热潮的出现。The control right of listed company has transferred frequently in China securities market since 1997, what are the causes? The paper discusses the significance of insider trading in the control transfer from the aspect of controlling shareholders. We analyze a model and find that the insider trading makes up the cost of controlling shareholders in the transfer of control rights, enlarges the deal areas of the control right, makes the transfer of control right much easier and more frequent. On this basis, we collect the sample of listed companies from 1997 to 2001 and test the following the results: (1) there are much insider trading in the transfer of control right in listed companies in China; (2) the controlling shareholders are related to insider trading; the more the controlling shareholders pay, the more seriously the insider trading will happen; the more shares the previous controlling shareholders hold, the more seriously the insider trading will happen; the more cash than non-cash payment, the more seriously the insider trading will happen. The paper tells that the transfer of control right is much easier to happen, because the controlling shareholders can get compensation from the insider trading. This is why the con- trol right of listed company has transferred frequently since 1997 in China securities market. The main contributions of the paper are as follows: firstly, we find the insider trading can compensate the interest of controlling shareholders, thus the transfer of control right is more frequent, which supplies a new aspect of understanding the causes of the happening of the control transfer; secondly, we find the empirical evidence of the relation between the controlling shareholders and insider trading, which also enlarges the acknowledge of the entities in insider trading in securities markets.
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