金融担保机构信用风险的生成机理研究  

Study on Emergence Mechanism to Credit Risk of Finance Guarantee Agency

作　　者：顾海峰[1] 奚君羊[2] 

机构地区：[1]常熟理工学院,江苏常熟215500 [2]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2009年第4期49-58,共10页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(07CJY062)

摘　　要：在企业申请担保贷款投资项目中,大多数中小企业(特别是科技型中小企业)缺乏可抵押标的,这导致了中小企业信贷交易中担保风险的生成。企业申请担保贷款投资项目的平均成功概率与企业提供的担保标的的价值成正相关关系;企业提供抵押是有效抑制或消除担保机构与中小企业之间信息不对称及由此而引发的逆向选择和道德风险问题的关键和必要条件。另外,在信息不对称的情况下,信用担保行业的系统性风险越小,意味着信用担保实践的平均成功率越高,这将诱发经理人道德风险的发生。In applying for secured loan application in the enterprise investment projects, the majority of SMEs （small and medium enterprises, especially science and technology） are lack of collateral, which make the SME credit guarantee transactions generate risk. The average probability of success in applying is positive related to the value of the collateral. The mortgage business is to effectively control or eliminate the risks result in the information asymmetry between the security agencies and SMEs, such as advert selection and moral hazard. In addition, in the case of asymmetric information, credit guarantee industry bear less systemic risk, which means that the practice of credit guarantee will have higher average success rate, and it will induce the occurrence of manager＇s moral hazard.

关 键 词：担保贷款 逆向选择 道德风险 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]