议会至上与行政主导:预算权力配置的理想与现实  

The Supremacy of Legislature and the Dominion of Executive:Ideality and Reality in Fixing the Power of Budgeting

作　　者：朱大旗[1] 何遐祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学法学院

出　　处：《中国人民大学学报》2009年第4期128-135,共8页Journal of Renmin University of China

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目<预算法的修改与完善研究>(07BFX041)

摘　　要：预算权力在行政与立法之间的分配是预算权力配置的核心问题。一般而言,议会在现代政治生活中居于至高的地位,议会至上原则在现代政治国家的预算安排中得到普遍的接受。但是,基于分权的要求以及预算的特殊性质,行政权力在预算制度的发展过程中逐渐取得了主导地位。对我国而言,预算法治化改革首先应强调立法机关的权威地位,落实其在预算中的最终决定权并使行政权力在预算决策领域进行必要的收缩。而针对行政系统内部高度集权的现状,也须对预算权力在行政系统内部的配置进行必要的改革。It is a core issue to fix legislature and executive properly in the power of budgeting. Normally, the supremacy of legislature is a common principle inmost countries in the area of budget-related matters, in theory and in statutes. However, because of the request of the division of powers and the characteristics of budget, the executive branch plays actually a dominant role in the process of budge- ting. As related to China, the conception .of the supremacy of legislature needs to be strengthened, which means all expending of the government should be under the approval of legislature. Meanwhile, the power of budgeting in the executive branch should be decentralized moderately.

关 键 词：预算权力 议会至上 行政主导 

分 类 号：D922.21[政治法律—经济法学]