劳动分工取代自给自足的演化分析  

EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY BY LABOR DIVISION

作　　者：杨旭[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2009年第7期31-38,共8页Economic Theory and Business Management

摘　　要：劳动分工取代自给自足面临着两个主要挑战:分工的协调问题和自给自足策略的风险占优问题。进行制度分析和演化博弈分析后我们可以得出如下结论:分工的协调问题可以通过优胜劣汰的自然选择自动解决;自给自足的风险占优问题则要通过建立"城市"、"集市"等制度来解决。Based on the evolutionary game theory, the paper revealed two main challenges in the process of substitution from self-sufficiency to labor division. One is the co-ordination problem for labor di- vision. The other one is that the strategy of self-sufficiency risk dominates the strategy of labor division. After that, the paper explored how the people in the reality solved those problems. And at last drew the conclusions that the co-ordination problem can be automatically resolved by the natural selection for the survival of the fittest, and depending on the establishment of some institutions such as urban and fair, the problem of risk domination could be resolved.

关 键 词：劳动分工 自给自足 演化博弈论 风险占优 协调 城市 

分 类 号：F014.2[经济管理—政治经济学]