工程建设项目中业主对承包方的激励契约研究  

An Analysis of the Contract of the Owners and the Contractor in Engineering Project

作　　者：傅春燕[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,成都610064 [2]四川省机械研究设计院,成都610065

出　　处：《软科学》2009年第7期51-53,共3页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70873086)

摘　　要：讨论了工程项目中业主对隐藏成本信息的承包商进行激励。通过动态博弈分析以及委托代理分析,得到了最优激励契约。在此契约中,承包商的最优行为同时也使得业主的利益达到最大化,有效地控制了成本。另外,业主还可以用该契约对特定质量水平的项目进行承包商的选择。This paper discusses how the owner encourage the contractor who hid the cost information in engineering project. The best incentive contract has been made through the analysis of dynamic game and the principal - agent relationships. The contractor will do the best action to make the owner to maximize the benefits and effectively control the costs. In addition, the owner can also choose the contractor in the project on the specific level of quality by the contract.

关 键 词：建设 项目 博弈 激励 契约 

分 类 号：F062.4[经济管理—政治经济学]