城市拆迁中开发商和政府部门的行为分析——基于扩展式博弈的角度  

Analysis on the Behaviors of the Developer and the Government Branch——Based on the Extended Game Theory

作　　者：彭小兵[1,2] 邓琳莹[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学贸易与行政学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆大学农村金融与人力资源研究中心,重庆400030

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2009年第8期140-143,共4页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70703039)

摘　　要：城市拆迁中,政府部门、拆迁人、被拆迁人是具有不同利益的博弈主体。文章研究拆迁人和政府部门的行为,通过扩展式博弈,对城市拆迁进程中开发商是否合法拆迁,政府部门是否进行监管,开发商是否行贿这几个问题进行了探讨,将政府部门的行为分为政府部门清廉的情况和政府部门贪腐的情况。并且,分析了能实现使开发商和政府部门行为满足社会利益最大化所需要的的约束条件。得出结论是要实现开发商合法拆迁的主要方法在于加强政府对野蛮拆迁的罚款力度,加强上级部门对拆迁直接监管部门的激励和加强政府部门的廉政建设。In the urban demolitation, the government branch, the developer and the dismantled are the three players of the game with individual interests. This article discusses about the action of developer and government branch. Using the extended game theory, this article discusses on whether the developer will dismantle buildings in a legal way, and on whether the government branch will supervise, whether the developer will bribe. This article also analysises the constraint conditions which made the developer and the government branch＇s actions reach the maximum social interests. It gets three conlusions ： first, if we want the developer to dismantle in an loyal way, we need to give them more penalty when they offend the rules; the second, the government branch should give more motivations on the direct supervision department; the third, building the honest and clean politics in the government departments is very important.

关 键 词：城市拆迁 博弈论 

分 类 号：F292[经济管理—国民经济]