基于企业激励理论的国有企业动力机制分析  

Analysis of state-owned enterprises' motion mechanism:based on incentive theories

作　　者：曾爱军[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东商学院会计学院,广东广州510270

出　　处：《重庆工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第4期54-57,共4页Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University：Social Science Edition

摘　　要：所有者的动力是企业治理机制的原动力,是企业治理机制得以运转的保障。而这一动力在我国国有企业中却严重不足。造成这一现象的原因主要有我国国有企业终极财权的分离、现行的国有资产管理体制不完善,激发国有企业动力机制应该正确认识国有企业经营者的地位和作用,健全经理人员市场,建立选择经营者的有效制度以及设计有效的经营者激励与约束机制等方面入手。The motion of owners＇ is the source and security of corporate governance. Unfortunately, the motion mechanism is de- ficient in China. The causes of this phenomenon include the separation of the terminating ownership of property and the flaw of Chi- na＇ s state-owned enterprises＇ corporate governance. To promote the corporate governance of China＇ s state-owned enterprises, we should improve the understanding of status and effect of the managers in China ＇ s state-owned enterprises, robust the managers market, set up the effective mechanism to select managers and design the effective incentive and restricting mechanism for managers.

关 键 词：企业治理 治理效率 国有企业 动力机制 

分 类 号：F231[经济管理—会计学]