中国省级政府为什么努力发展经济?  

Why China's Provincial Governments Try Their Best to Develop Economy?

作　　者：段润来[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院 [2]烟台大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《南方经济》2009年第8期16-25,55,共11页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目;"产业聚集与区域经济协调发展研究"(06JZD0031)的阶段性研究成果之一

摘　　要：基于省级领导人是自利的假定,本文从一个新的视角来解释中国经济增长。因为地方领导人(各省的书记和省长)能够从自由处置某些财政资源中获得效用,因此,权力对他们极为重要,中央政府的人事安排将显著影响省级领导人的效用。在行政系统中,大部分省级领导人晋升机会很小,而一部分人必须退出。因此,对一些省级领导人来说,保留原职是最佳选择。模型显示,因为中央政府使用GDP标准考核省级领导人,中央政府将惩罚不努力发展经济的省级领导人,而不是提升经济发展较好的省级领导人的承诺,是激励省级领导人竭尽全力发展地方经济最重要的动力。This paper presents a new view to interpret China＇s rapid growth, based on the assumption that the provincial leaders are self-interested. Because local leaders secretaries and governors of province - can get utility from freely allocating some financial resource, the power which comes from central government is vital. In the bureaucrat system, since the probability of promotion is small to most provincial leaders, and some must exit, it is their best to choose to maintain power to some provincial leaders. The theory implies that the commit of punishment will get more incentive than promotion. Because central government uses GDP as the standard to assess the provincial leaders, it is the fundamental cause of the provincial governments work hard to develop local economy that the commit of central government would punish the provincial leaders who made little efforts instead of promoting those tried their best.

关 键 词：省级领导人 惩罚 晋升 

分 类 号：F061.2[经济管理—政治经济学]